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## ORGANIZING NONLETHAL ATTACK ASSETS IN OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONS

BY

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#### **ABSTRACT**

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Nonlethal attack assets, specifically public affairs, psychological operations and civil affairs, are often the first deep strike option of the operational and strategic commander. Organizing, integrating and synchronizing these assets into the staff structure and campaign plan is often poorly executed due to a lack of doctrine and joint tactics, techniques and procedures (JTTP). The result can be a nonlethal strike that is not linked to the overall plan and therefore late, ineffective or, at worst, contradictory to the operational or strategic aims. This project examines and then proposes a staff structure and methodology for integrating and synchronizing nonlethal assets. It provides a start point for development of detailed JTTP that will ensure timely, synergistic nonlethal attack. The implementation cost is minimal. The staff structure will be manned by existing personnel and the methodology is derived from doctrine but adapted to the unique nature of nonlethal attack.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Present Paradigm
The Problem Today 6
Identification of the Solution-Organization
Identification of the Solution-Process
How to Integrate and Synchronize-North African Vignette
Results-Present and Future
Endnotes 25
Selected Bibliography

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-Battle Space Framework		• • • • • •	 	 . 3
Figure 2-Notional IW Cell			 	 . 11
Figure 3-Notional Fires Cell			 	 . 13
Figure 4-JTF Planning Process			 	 20
Figure 5-JTF Synchronization Mat	trix		 	 . 21
Figure 6-Targeting Synchronization	n Matrix		 	 22

#### The Present Paradigm

The nation's defense establishment is struggling today with roles, missions and future doctrine driven by advances in technology and a "revolution" in military affairs.

The information age has sparked a healthy dialogue among these defense leaders.... How will we control the myriad of information available? What are the filters available to the commander so that "total situational awareness" is meaningful? These questions and many more pertain to the interpretation of massive amounts of incoming information to the commander. Equally important, but not fully understood, is how the commander uses the information available to him to affect the outcome of strategic and operational campaigns. He does this, in large part, through the integrated and synchronized effects of Command and Control Warfare (C2W). Public Affairs (PA), Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are the key elements in his pool of nonlethal attack assets. How the commander organizes to exploit these capabilities is critical to success, but rarely understood or effectively applied.

A key point to consider when discussing Joint Vision XXI, Force XXI, or other initiatives the armed services are considering for future military operations, is that the planning paradigm will not change, even if the tools do. The commander will still be required to delineate and shape the battle space; weigh and organize the main effort; and integrate and synchronize using the appropriate planning organization. The entire focus

of this planning process remains the same—attack and destroy the enemy center of gravity.

The commander initially considers his battle space. Battle space is a physical volume that includes breadth, width and height in which a commander positions and moves forces over time.<sup>2</sup> The battle space is considered without regard to boundaries and, therefore, gives the commander the opportunity to expand his thinking on how he will dominate the enemy and protect the force.

Desert Storm provides an example of a traditional battle space. The operational center of gravity (COG) was the Republican Guard forces. This force-oriented COG allowed GEN Schwartzkopf to delineate his battle space with deep, close and rear battle areas for what would be a linear, symmetric campaign. The battle space was lethally shaped by extensive air operations supported by a robust PSYOP effort. The main effort for ground operations was the VII Corps, weighted with Field Artillery Brigades, logistics and aviation. Military planners are all familiar with this methodology and can cite numerous other examples of similar efforts in traditional battle spaces.

Somalia or Bosnia can be considered as less traditional. Using the same model, the commander again considers battle space in terms of the COG. The operational center of gravity in these and many other examples of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is neither force nor terrain oriented. It could be the "perceptions" of factions, the support of belligerents for specific leaders or the leadership itself.<sup>3</sup> This expands the battle space beyond physical dimensions and time. In fact, the decisive points that protect or affect such centers of gravity may include rumors, the media and any number of external audiences. The battle space is now expanded beyond the traditional battlefield

with attack requirements outside the Joint Operational Area. The main effort to attack these decisive points or to directly attack a COG that involves "hearts and minds" of people are nonlethal assets. Specifically, PA can mold public opinion by providing honest, proactive information on friendly or enemy actions to the world audience. CA can provide the same information to the indigenous population through local civilian authorities and PSYOP can "attack" the belligerent force with a synchronized message focused on the target audience. In these operations, nonlethal assets may be supported by lethal assets. The deep, close and rear battles are defined in terms of time instead of space in this nonlinear battle space (see figure 1). The initial lessons learned report from Bosnia provides a real world example:

During the first 60 days of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Command and Control Warfare played a huge role in the task force's ability to gain information




Figure 1

dominance. For instance, the task force commander threatened to release information from...recons of the zone of separation, civil affairs and PSYOP teams, and the JMC (Joint Military Commission) process to the media. This was designed to convince the former warring factions to comply with the...Agreement for Peace.<sup>4</sup>

This planning paradigm example has focused on the operational level of war, but examination of the theater strategic level reinforces the requirement to properly apply nonlethal attack against strategic centers of gravity. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCAP), which lays out warfighting responsibilities of the commanders in chief (CINCs), discusses "informational" FDOs (Flexible Deterrent Options) as initial deterrent measures.<sup>5</sup> Consider these deterrent measures as the theater strategic deep fight. If successful, the close fight will never be joined, saving time, money and, most importantly, lives. This deep strike occurs as a time based and not terrain oriented attack. One can be easily lulled into a feeling that the combined effects of PA, CA and PSYOP are more appropriate as a main effort at the lower end of the conflict spectrum (e.g. MOOTW). Centers of gravity at the theater strategic level, however, are often not force oriented, regardless of the level of conflict. For instance, arguably, the strategic center of gravity in Desert Storm was Saddam Hussein or the Ba'ath Party. 6 Shaping world. indigenous and enemy perceptions of this type of COG is the work of the nonlethal arrows in the CINC's quiver.

Given the importance of these critical nonlethal attack assets in modern battle space, organizing, integrating and synchronizing them is critical to attain a successful effect. The previous Desert Storm example points out that this effort is well understood on the traditional battlefield, but it is not known on the nonlinear, asymmetric battle space of today. Joint doctrine is not definitive on how to organize, to properly integrate and to synchronize nonlethal attack. In fact, even the planning process, known in the Army as the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), is foreign to much of the U.S. Air Force

and U.S. Navy leadership. CINCs have addressed the problem by producing Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for planning. Yet in nearly all cases, joint doctrine allows the CINC or the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to have considerable leeway in his organization. Joint Task Forces (JTFs), being typically ad hoc and traditionally not having standing staffs that integrate nonlethal assets such as PA, CA and PSYOP, have added to the dilemma. Furthermore, it is unlikely that staff sections focused on nonlethal attack will be formed at standing core headquarters given the present manning constraints of the armed services. These, as of now unresourced, assets provide the first, deep strike of the JTF and (within a crisis environment) must be quickly organized to ensure synergism and linkage to strategic aims. 8 It is obvious to military planners that there exists a need for Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures describing options for the Joint Force Commander to organize and to apply these assets to ensure they are fully integrated and synchronized with the overall campaign plan. If this is not done these efforts have the potential of becoming stovepiped and late at best, or contradictory to the operational campaign plan or strategic objectives, at worst.

Numerous organizational options exist and have been employed on past operations within the combatant commands and JTFs with varying degrees of success. Among these are the Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC), the Joint Force Fires Coordination Cell (JFFCC), the Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF), the Information Warfare (IW) Cell or some combination thereof. The remainder of this effort will examine each of these options and weigh their effectiveness across the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, this project will examine how the integration and synchronization

process should take place within the joint staff once the appropriate organization is chosen.

#### The Problem Today

Warfighters at the tactical level know where to get answers to questions about the best staff structure for combat or MOOTW situations--doctrine. Joint doctrine would be the obvious start point to research the proper mechanism to integrate PA, CA and PSYOP at the operational and theater strategic level. While joint doctrine has made great strides in the past several years producing many relevant publications, critical gaps and seams still remain. This is particularly true in the important area of nonlethal attack.

Since PA, CA and PSYOP are integrally entwined under the umbrella of C2W,

Joint Publication 3-13.1 ("Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare") is a good

place to start. This publication provides for a C2W Cell which recommends inclusion of

PA and CA representatives. It indicates, however, that the JFC should establish

mechanisms to effectively coordinate these efforts and that there are a number of ways he
can do this. It doesn't offer any specific options on how the C2W effort will be

integrated in the overall plan in a timely manner. Joint Publication 3-05 ("Doctrine for

Joint Special Operations") indicates that Information Warfare (IW) has been added as the

ninth special operations mission and that PSYOP accomplish operational and strategic

objectives for IW. Emerging doctrine is also ambiguous. Joint Publication 5-00.2

("Procedures for Forming and Organizing a Joint Staff," Preliminary Coordinating Draft)

presents an IW Cell to integrate PA, CA and PSYOP, but gives no details regarding the

composition of that cell or its role in the overall effort.<sup>11</sup> Joint Publication 3-09 ("Doctrine for Joint Fire Support," Third Draft) discusses the role of the Joint Force Fires Coordinator in integrating C2W with other fires.<sup>12</sup> The Universal Joint Task List, which is a blueprint for Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETL), includes tasks under strategic and operational firepower to conduct nonlethal attack and lethal interdiction.<sup>13</sup> This implies a requirement to integrate such efforts, but doesn't provide a mechanism to do so.

If this all sounds confusing, imagine the added friction this would cause to an ad hoc JTF, standing up to deal with a crisis and recognizing that his nonlethal effort must be executed as the first strike of the operation. The organization of choice to integrate this effort (if one is chosen at all) might be based on vague doctrinal readings which are also contradictory. It is easy to understand why the JFACC, JFFCC, JPOTF or an IW Cell are often chosen. Depending on the doctrine that is used and the comfort level of the commander with an organization, any one of these organizations might be considered appropriate. The crisis dictates that there is little time to do much beyond this initial, cursory analysis. This emphasizes the requirement to determine an optimum organization prior to the crisis, and to incorporate these findings into doctrine. Considering the present lack of doctrinal guidance, a start point may be in deciding what PA, CA and PSYOP have in common. This commonality may then reveal existing integrating mechanisms that can be augmented or interfaced with the appropriate nonlethal expertise.

PA, CA and PSYOP all have targets or target audiences. For PA it's the world (or local) populace. CA "targets" the local civilian officials in a theater of operations.

PSYOP focuses its efforts on targeting enemy or belligerent leaders, forces or factions

with a truthful message. Emerging doctrine recognizes this targeting association by recommending PA, CA and PSYOP coordination occur with the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) to ensure favorable IW support is developed. The JTCB then performs its doctrinal mission of providing broad targeting oversight functions while monitoring the total (lethal and nonlethal) targeting effort. This seems to make sense and supports the view of nonlethal attack as a targeting asset, but does not answer the question of who is best suited to integrate these assets (on a micro level) on the staff or within the command. It does, however, provide a reasoned basis for analysis for the JFC as he trains to properly form his command and staff.

### Identification of the Solution-Organization

The JFACC is a reasonable option for analysis, especially if one considers PA, CA and PSYOP as nonlethal targeting assets. The JFACC is charged with planning coordinating and deconflicting joint air targeting and is therefore fully trained in the joint targeting process. PA, CA and PSYOP representatives could be integrated fairly easily into the JFACC staff either as individual experts or as part of an IW Cell. In fact, air assets are often used as delivery platforms for PSYOP themes to targets (e.g. "Commando Solo" as well as leaflet delivery) and therefore appear on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) generated by the JFACC. PSYOP staff representation could provide added emphasis on the use of air to nonlethally attack targets.

The JFACC also presents serious concerns as the integrator of nonlethal assets.

The JFACC focuses on lethal targets and electronic warfare. Additionally, the JFACC is

a component of the JFC. As with any component, the danger exists that component interest and focus may take precedence without an appreciation of nonlethal requirements or priorities. This tendency could be monitored and checked by the JTCB as part of its oversight function. Another concern exists if the JFACC is physically separated from the JFC headquarters. This physical separation could mean that the PA, CA and PSYOP effort will be fully integrated with the air operation but not necessarily with the overall JFC plan.

The second option a commander may consider is a dedicated targeting staff section or cell at the Joint Force headquarters level. This section could ensure an overarching synchronized targeting effort for the JFC. It would provide the detailed integration and wargaming effort to ensure synchronized air, ground and sea targeting efforts. In this sense it is a "micro" focused section that feeds into the JTCB which provides the "macro" oversight function. (Recall that the JTCB coordinates targeting, vice integrating and synchronizing it). Except for JFC directed targets it would not usurp the role of components in developing specific targets and target sets. This function has been performed in past exercises and contingencies by a Joint Force Fires Coordination Cell (JFFCC). Controversy surrounds this section principally due to a lack of understanding of its scope and responsibilities. It should not perform, in most cases, detailed target analyses. It fact, it will typically not be manned to perform this function lethally, where the JFACC and Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) will be. What it can do is delegate specific lethal targets to components to detect, strike and assess, based on the commander's guidance and a targeting wargame. This section then can also be expanded to include PA, CA and PSYOP representation, thereby ensuring a

total (lethal and nonlethal), joint, focused targeting effort at the JTF level. A disadvantage of this option is that once again the "core" staff section would more than likely have lethal expertise background and may not allow the proper emphasis on nonlethal targeting.

If PA, CA and PSYOP are time-sensitive, critical nonlethal assets at the operational and strategic level, then perhaps they deserve a section or cell solely dedicated to nonlethal coordination, integration and synchronization. The Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) provides such an option. The JPOTF has typically focused all PSYOP efforts at the joint force level. As a component, the Commander, JPOTF, has direct access to the Joint Force Commander so nonlethal emphasis will be elevated above the joint staff level. Additionally, the option of the JPOTF as the nonlethal integrator ensures that a trained staff will be immediately available to the ad hoc JTF since PSYOP has been assigned the SOF mission of IW. This also ensures the early integration and shaping efforts are synchronized since PSYOP forces will be focused on the pre-hostilities phase and understand themes and theme approval procedures. 18 There are several disadvantages to using a JPOTF for the overall joint force nonlethal targeting effort. First, they are not targeting experts. The nonlethal effort, therefore, could be stovepiped and not integrated with the lethal effort. Additionally, much like the JFACC, if the cell is not colocated with the joint force headquarters there is a possibility of component focus, rather than overall joint force focus.

Total focus on nonlethal assets could also be provided by an IW Cell at the joint staff level or subordinate to a joint staff section. The composition of this cell is not defined by doctrine, but could be as shown in figure 2. An IW cell provides total focus

## **NOTIONAL IW CELL**




Figure 2

on information warfare issues to include all of C2W as well as PA and CA. The IW Cell is the only organization in emerging doctrine (Joint Publication 5-00.2, Draft) identified as a mechanism for the coordination, integration and synchronization of PA, CA and PSYOP. If incorporated into the joint staff, this cell would have direct access to J3 Operations and J5 Plans to ensure effective nonlethal integration into the overall plan. The link to targeting must still occur requiring an interface with whatever lethal targeting structure is present on the staff or in the command. This interface could therefore be with the JFACC, JTCB or JFFCC. A disadvantage of this cell is that resident expertise may not exist on an ad hoc JTF core staff and the IW Cell may be ad hoc in and of itself. This

can cause initial confusion and delays as the cell attempts to activate at the critical time nonlethal battle space shaping operations should occur.

Having discussed four options for integrating the nonlethal attack assets at the operational and theater strategic level, the question is what organization or mix best meets the needs of the Joint Force? The decision needs to center around the fact that PA, CA and PSYOP are the JFC's shaping assets (first strike) as well as his deep strike assets in a nonlinear battle space. There needs to be early focus on these assets based on their initial importance. Additionally, PA, CA and PSYOP have targeting implications and so they must interface and be integrated with whatever lethal targeting mechanism the JFC has established. The result must be a synchronized joint force targeting effort, ensuring vertical and horizontal linkage with campaign plans, without component bias.

Focus on nonlethal assets is best provided by a JPOTF or IW Cell. The JPOTF has expertise and a focus on PSYOP, but not on PA and CA. The JPOTF will have difficulty integrating with the overall JFC plan if not colocated. On the other hand, the IW Cell will have total focus on all nonlethal attack assets and be an integral part of the joint staff. It can ensure horizontal linkage of these assets at JFC level and vertical linkage with higher headquarters as well as oversight, tasking and advice to subordinates. The IW Cell should be the choice of the JFC for the integration and synchronization of PA, CA and PSYOP.

The IW Cell must interface with the lethal targeting organization. The structure of this organization presents the next challenge to the JFC. Compare the JFACC and JFFCC. The JFACC can integrate PA, CA and PSYOP into air targeting, but will not synchronize it with the total targeting effort (air, ground, maritime, SOF) unless tasked by

the JFC to coordinate the joint force targeting effort. Avoiding component bias and providing an overall targeting focus for the joint force requires a staff section dedicated to that role on the joint staff. The JFFCC fulfills that role. The JFFCC core is typically found on the core JFC staff section as a fires element of the appropriate service upon which an ad hoc JTF is formed.

My findings are that the optimum option to ensure timely and total integration of PA, CA and PSYOP into the overall joint force effort is an IW Cell and JFFCC with a

## **NOTIONAL FIRES CELL**




Figure 3 targeting interface on the joint staff. The targeting interface ensures only one fires proponent advisor (lethal and nonlethal) to the JFC. (Proposed organization of these cells are shown in figures 2 and 3.)

## Identification of the Problem-Process

The convergence of lethal and nonlethal assets is critical for their proper target integration and synchronization. In order for this interface to be successful it is important to consider which cell has the lead for the overall targeting effort. Once determined, that section can then ensure total targeting integration in the overall JFC plan. The lead agency for targeting (JFFCC or IW Cell) will depend both on the type and the phase of the operation.

The pre-hostilities phase of an operation by definition is nonlethal. Press conferences and news releases at the national strategic level will act to directly or indirectly attack perceptions and world opinion about a potential enemy situation. Theater strategic informational FDOs will likely target the center of gravity if it is non-traditional. PA and PSYOP play the critical role in shaping world and enemy perceptions during this phase. At the operational level the JTF is activating at this time, but must ensure its nonlethal first strike in the Joint Operational Area (JOA) is linked and therefore supports the themes of higher headquarters and the National Command Authorities (NCA). This linkage of PA and PSYOP themes at all levels of command is doctrinally critical, and must be rapidly exploited to affect fleeting opportunities. During the pre-hostilities phase of an operation, the lead for targeting must be the IW Cell. Lethal targeting expertise will be included in the IW Cell during this phase to ensure a smooth, integrated transition to nonlethal and/or lethal shaping in future phases. The ad hoc nature of the IW Cell in a forming JTF is still an issue that merits discussion at this critical point. The criticality of linkage to the strategic plan and the time sensitive nature of the nonlethal

attack requires a core cell at the JTF that is fully attuned to the situation at national and theater strategic levels. The solution to this dilemma is an IW Cell "plug" provided to the JTF by the supported combatant commander. This core cell would need augmentation, but would include key personnel who have been involved in the theater strategic deep strike and arrive prepared to rapidly exploit themes at the operational level of war.

Continuity with themes and intent is thereby ensured. Additionally, since these personnel are likely to be members of the supported CINC's staff, they should have developed a relationship that enhances vertical coordination at the JTF level. In peacetime, these personnel would have been predesignated by name and position and accordingly trained during joint training exercises.

As the JFC moves into the execution phases of an operation, the targeting lead may change based on the level of intensity. MOOTW by its very nature, does not focus on lethal attack. Additionally, it is very likely that the center of gravity will be nontraditional, even at the operational level of war. Consequently, attacking this COG, directly or indirectly, typically involves shaping perceptions. PA, CA and PSYOP are the principle tools available to the JTF Commander to perform this function. While CA will not normally be employed in the pre-hostilities phase of MOOTW, it is critical in the execution phases. CA will provide the interface with local officials that allows the smooth introduction of forces thus protecting friendly forces and changing attitudes and perceptions of local leaders. CA also acts as an information and intelligence asset by providing feedback to the JTF on attitudes and perceptions of the populace as seen by local officials and assessment of JTF nonlethal efforts through official discussions with those same officials. All of these nonlethal attack assets may be ineffective, however,

without the threat of lethal firepower should the nonlethal main effort fail. In fact, some MOOTW require the significant presence of lethal assets (e.g. peace enforcement). The IW Cell should retain the targeting lead for all subsequent phases of MOOTW. Again, the JFFCC interfaces with and supports the IW Cell in this effort, planning lethal, supporting targeting and executing the lethal targeting plan if nonlethal efforts fail. If it becomes necessary for the JFFCC to take the lead in this scenario it can be argued that the operation can no longer be considered MOOTW.

A combat operation considered mid-intensity in nature will likely have a force or terrain oriented operational center of gravity. Pre-hostility nonlethal attack will still be the initial deep strike at strategic and operational level. Shaping in future phases will be lethally focused supported by nonlethal targeting. In a mid-intensity environment, then, the IW Cell will have the targeting lead for the pre-hostility phase only and will then assume a supporting role to the JFFCC in subsequent phases. A mid-intensity environment requires active, fully integrated participation by lethal and nonlethal targeting agencies. In MOOTW, lethal targeting assets are used as a show of force and "reserve" to attack only if the nonlethal main effort fails. In the mid-intensity environment, nonlethal assets strike in a synchronous manner with lethal assets (e.g. the integrated PSYOP and air operation in Desert Storm). This requires close coordination and full integration and synchronization under the lead of the JFFCC.

The optimum organization, thus described, ensures that the targeting effort at joint force level is focused on the appropriate main effort, integrated and synchronized throughout all phases of the operation and vertically and horizontally linked to plans and

aims. This effort will not detract from component targeting, but provide a top down focus to ensure the synergism of the entire joint force.

## How to Integrate and Synchronize-North African Vignette

Now that the organization is established to integrate and synchronize nonlethal assets, a discussion of how the JFFCC and IW cells work internally and within the joint staff is appropriate. Consider the following North African vignette as a vehicle to describe the targeting integration and synchronization process. Libyan forces with expansionist tendencies have taken over the governments of Chad and Sudan over a three year period creating the North African Republic. They now threaten Tunisia and intelligence says their invasion of Tunisia is probable. The United States NCA decide to conduct a Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) on the recommendation of the U.S. Ambassador in Tunis, and prepare to conduct combat operations as a follow-on if necessary.

Initial nonlethal shaping of the battle space will occur at the national strategic level and has probably been occurring as Libya expanded and threatened her neighbors. The focus of this effort is developed by the political and diplomatic elements of power and directed against the strategic center of gravity (defined here as world and indigenous support of Libyan leadership). Politically, the Libyans are condemned in White House press releases and Presidential new conferences. Diplomatically, U.S. introduced UN resolutions and condemnations act to turn world opinion against the Libyan government. This is supported by behind the scenes diplomacy by the Department of State.

The military element of power becomes more critical as the crisis intensifies. If the diplomatic and political efforts are unsuccessful in preventing Libyan expansion and threats, the theater CINC will be alerted to begin planning by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CINC and his staff have watched this area closely over the past three years and are intimately familiar with all aspects of Libyan political and military actions which have occurred during that timeframe. The initial theater strategic actions will be the employment of informational FDOs with a focus on Public Affairs and PSYOP as the main effort. Military press conferences with national media themes may be held. Strategic PSYOP in theater will begin to stress U.S. resolve and capability. These nonlethal deep strikes are supported by SOF insertions for strategic reconnaissance and the presence of a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean to provide a show of force. Remember, if this initial "strike" is successful we will not have to commit combat forces since Libya will refrain from its aggressive stance on the Tunisian border.

As the Libyan threat continues, the U.S. decides to execute the NEO in Tunisia and the CINC identifies forces and forms a JTF to conduct the mission. Intelligence from SOF, as well as human intelligence (HUMINT) in Tunisia, indicate Tunisian heavy forces remain loyal to the Tunis government but have been infiltrated by Libyan terrorists.

Some of these heavy forces are considered capable of becoming renegade units at the Division level. The operational center of gravity for the NEO has been identified as the continued support of the heavy Tunisian forces for their government. The friendly operational center of gravity is force protection.

As the JTF activates, the CINC provides a core IW Cell staff (which will probably require additional augmentation) to the JTF. This core is intimately familiar with the PSYOP and PA shaping efforts at theater level. They begin to integrate and synchronize the operational shaping efforts immediately as the main effort in the pre-hostilities phase, while maintaining an imbedded focus with the CINC's efforts. The Joint Force Commander must provide shaping guidance as part of commander's guidance immediately after mission analysis within the military decisionmaking process. The analysis of commmander's intent and guidance for shaping is critical to achieving a clear visualization of the shaping effort. The commander should define the endstate of the prehostilities phase based on the nonlethal shaping effort. (What will the battle space look like after successful shaping operations?) This visualization and endstate are key to the incorporation of shaping in Course of Action (COA) development. The initial nonlethal shaping concept is developed quickly within the (COA) development phase of planning to the level of detail necessary to allow shaping operations to begin. This effort will be more than an outline, but probably less than a complete IW or C2W annex. Remember at this point that the JFFCC has a representative in the IW Cell to ensure that lethal targeting support is planned to support the nonlethal effort or to be executed should the nonlethal effort fail. The shaping concept is then quickly wargamed and presented to the commander for approval and execution. (See figure 4). In the vignette, initial shaping efforts could include PSYOP efforts via pamphlet drop or distribution as to U.S. intentions, and initial coordination by in country SOF to establish Joint Military/Civilian Commissions. The initial public affairs effort ensures a consistent, truthful message portrayed to the world during initial military press conferences again emphasizing

legitimacy and purpose of the operation. The lethal show of force will continue with the carrier battle group positioned to dissuade Libyan attack into Tunisia.

## JTF PLANNING PROCESS




Figure 4

As NEO forces deploy in Tunisia in the execution phase, the nonlethal shaping effort continues focused on a humanitarian effort within Tunisia to shape the perceptions of the Tunisian people in favor of U.S. presence. This indirectly attacks Libyan attempts to gain the Tunisian Army and people's favor. This MOOTW environment still requires IW Cell targeting lead with JFFCC support. The nonlethal effort will involve the integrated efforts of Non-Governmental Organizations, as well as PA, CA and PSYOP. "Doctors Without Borders" will establish an immunization clinic; PSYOP Teams ensure the populace knows about it through handbills or broadcasts; CA coordinates with local officials to establish the site and time of the clinic; and PA ensures widespread coverage of the effort. A plausible fallout from this may be HUMINT indicating a renegade Tunisian armor division will move out of garrison within 72 hours to attack U.S. NEO forces.

The J3 Plans begins immediate planning for this branch given the short anticipated timeframe. The JFFCC takes the targeting lead in what is expected to be a lethal heavy effort. The targeting effort is synchronized in fairly general terms within the JTF wargame to ensure overall targeting integration with the JTF plan (figure 5, JTF

# JTF SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

	H-24	Н	H+3	H+6	H+8
ENEMY ACTION	MOVEMENT FROM GARRISON	AD BEGINS MOVEMENT	AD PL TN	AD PL KY	AD DOG
INTELLIGENCE					
C2					
FIRES - LETHAL - NON-LETHAL	-NONLETHAL PREP -DEEP FIGHT	-JSEAD ON CALL -CONTINUE NON- LETHAL ATK	CAS	JAAT EA KILL	BHO TO ARFOR
M2		AIR CAV SCREEN			
SUPPORT					
PROTECTION					
DECISION POINTS			REQUEST HOSTILE ROE		

Figure 5

Synchronization Matrix). The JFFCC then conducts a detailed targeting wargame to synchronize all fires (lethal and nonlethal) with the IW Cell supporting. This will ensure the specificity necessary to produce orders and guidance for executing subordinate components (figure 6, Targeting Synchronization Matrix). The targeting wargame results in an initial nonlethal deep strike in which PSYOP warns belligerents of the consequences of their anticipated actions; CA coordinates with local official to establish refugee routes; and PA ensures that the world is aware of the aggressive nature of the belligerents. Use of fly-by fighter aircraft as a show of force could support this effort.

## TARGETING SYNCH MATRIX

	H-24	Н	H+3	H+6	H+8
ENEMY ACTION	MOVEMENT FROM GARRISON	8AD BEGINS MOVEMENT	8AD PL TN	8AD PLKY	8AD DOG
FIRES - LETHAL - NON-LETHAL	-NONLETHAL PREP -DEEP FIGHT	-JSEAD ON CALL -CONTINUE NON- LETHAL ATK	CAS	JAAT EA KILL	BHO TO ARFOR
ARTILLERY/ATACMS					
CAS					
AI					
NGF/TLAMS					
IW					
DECISION POINTS			REQUEST HOSTILE ROE		

Figure 6

Should the belligerents still decide to move out of garrison to attack, the nonlethal effort continues but only as a supporting effort to increasingly lethal targeting.

As the situation worsens the role of lethal targeting takes precedence. Should the Libyans conduct an attack into Tunisia, we would naturally respond with a lethal targeting main effort supported by nonlethal attack. The JFFCC would obviously have the targeting lead with the IW Cell playing a significant supporting role similar to that described in the Desert Storm example.

This vignette serves to illustrate targeting responsibilities in broad terms across the spectrum of conflict. Key points to remember are the imbedded nature of nonlethal and lethal targeting at each level of command; the IW Cell targeting lead during the pre-hostilities phase; the time sensitivity and modified decisionmaking process for shaping as the JTF stands up; and the transfer of targeting lead to the JFFCC as the conflict moves from MOOTW to mid-intensity. Understanding not only the proper organization but also the correct process for nonlethal and lethal targeting will produce an integrated and synchronized plan that will provide the synergism for success.

## Results-Present and Future

As the joint commander prepares for military operations his focus has and will remain the same, regardless of the technological advances he has at his disposal. He still will define and shape the battle space focusing his main effort to directly (if possible) or indirectly strike and destroy the enemy's center of gravity. It is increasingly evident that strategic and operational centers of gravity are often nontraditional in the sense that they are not force or terrain oriented but "perception" oriented. The principle tools available to attack these COGs are PA, CA and PSYOP. These nonlethal assets must be properly organized as a main effort and fully integrated to ensure a synchronized, synergistic effect. The interface of an IW Cell with the JFFCC at the JFC level provides a logical targeting structure to effectively accomplish the commander's mission. Furthermore, understanding the nonlethal and lethal organizational structure and targeting process allows this interface to be timely, integrated and linked both horizontally and vertically to campaign plans and strategic aims.

This research is only a start point. The organization to coordinate, integrate and synchronize nonlethal assets can be debated but soon it must be codified in joint doctrine. Different solutions for different combatant commands or vague JTF SOPs are not acceptable answers. Supported and supporting commanders must all understand the same methodology in terms of nonlethal targeting tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). Joint doctrine provides the authoritative vehicle to ensure this mutual understanding, and

to facilitate JTF training in peacetime rather than during crisis. This is particularly critical considering that the first nonlethal deep strike will occur as the JTF stands up.

Where this TTP should appear can be debated, but it would seem logical to find it as a part of the Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 ("Information Warfare") family of manuals. A publication of TTP for nonlethal targeting would have obvious implications for future updates and interface with JP 3-09 ("Doctrine for Joint Fire Support"), JP 3-56 ("Command and Control for Joint Air Operations") and JP 2-01.1 ("Intelligence Support to Targeting").

The need to integrate PA and PSYOP as the first, deep strategic or operational strike is understood and accepted as is the need to include CA in the "stabilization" phase of MOOTW. The organizational structure and process to perform this integration are not. The joint community must quickly come to grips with this critical gap by identifying solutions and incorporating them into doctrine. This research effort provides a model for such an organization and process. Further development of these ideas in a doctrinal TTP publication will help assure that the commander has a trained and ready joint force at the outset of and during crises thereby contributing to the overall success of the operation.

## **ENDNOTES**

- Department of Defense, <u>Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare</u>, Joint Publication 3-13.1 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 07 February 1996), IV-6, IV-7. While PA and CA are not integral parts of C2W, the reference indicates that integration of C2W with these two elements is critical.
- <sup>2</sup> Department of the Army, <u>Operations</u>, Army Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Army, June 1993), 6-12.
- <sup>3</sup> Clausewitz agrees when he states that "in popular uprisings it (the center of gravity) is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion," in <u>On War</u>, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 596.
- <sup>4</sup> "Operation Joint Endeavor, Initial Impression Report, May 1996 (Bosnia-Herzegovina)," Lessons Learned Report (FT Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, undated), 57-58.
- <sup>5</sup> Department of Defense, <u>Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.</u> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3110.01 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 20 December 1995), C-B-5.
- <sup>6</sup> Collin A. Agee, "Peeling the Onion: The Iraqi Center of Gravity in Desert Storm," (FT Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, July 1992), 16.
- <sup>7</sup> The author was exposed to the U.S. Atlantic Command's Mission Training Plan (MTP) while assigned to the Battle Command Training Program in 1995-1996. This MTP includes a planning methodology similar to the Army's doctrinal process.
- <sup>8</sup> Department of Defense, <u>Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations</u>, Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 30 July 1993), I-1.
- <sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, <u>Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare</u>. Joint Publication 3-13.1 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 07 February 1996), IV-1.
- <sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, <u>Doctrine for Joint Special Operations</u>, Joint Publication 3-05 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, undated), II-3, II-10.
- <sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, <u>Procedures for Forming and Operating a Joint Task Force</u>, Joint Publication 5-00.2 (Preliminary Coordinating Draft) (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 19 March 1996), VII-9.
- <sup>12</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, <u>Doctrine for Joint Fire Support</u>, Joint Publication 3-09 (Third Draft) (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, December 1995), A-7.

- <sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, <u>Universal Joint Task List</u>, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 15 May 1995), 2-50, 2-86.
  - <sup>14</sup> Procedures for Forming and Operating a Joint Task Force, VII-6.
- <sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, <u>Command and Control for Joint Air Operations</u>, Joint Publication 3-56.1 (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, 14 November 1994), GL-7.
  - <sup>16</sup> Ibid, IV-3.
- <sup>17</sup> <u>Doctrine for Joint Fire Support</u> (Third Draft), A-6 identifies the JFFCC as the primary staff advisor on the integration and synchronization of fires.
  - <sup>18</sup> Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, III-1.
- <sup>19</sup> Dennis J. Reimer, "Army-Air Force Warfighter Conference," Chief of Staff of the Army Yellow Paper 96-16, 30 December 1996. The term "JFFCC" is a contentious one between the Army and Air Force and will likely change. The name of this cell can be anything you want it to be as long as it is given responsibility for the overall JTF targeting integration effort.
  - <sup>20</sup> <u>Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations</u>, I-2 to I-3.
- <sup>21</sup> "Campaign Planning Exercise, Libya," Course 4, AY 97, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996). The broad concept for this vignette is taken from this exercise. Details have been structured to facilitate the discussion of nonlethal integration.

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